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There were few decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court
dealing with torts problems during the past term that deserve
extended comment. Several of the cases involved only issues of
fact.'
DUTY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION - ARCHITECT'S
LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS
Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corporation2 is the subject
of an able Note in this Review.3 It is therefore sufficient for
present purposes to summarize the facts and the conclusion.
Plaintiff brought a tort action to recover damages for the death
of her husband, an employee of a plumbing subcontractor who
died as the result of a boiler explosion which occurred during
the subcontractor's negligent installation of a hot water system
in a new hospital building. The defendants were the architect
who designed the building and his insurer. The architect had
undertaken by contract to provide the owner "adequate super-
vision of the execution of the work to reasonably insure strict
conformity with the working drawings, specifications and other
contract documents." Much of the opinion was devoted to the
claim that the architects had been guilty of active negligence
in approving a "shop drawing," which led to the occurrence of
the accident. The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeal,
found that the facts did not support this contention. The inter-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. D & D Planting Co. v. Employers Casualty Co., 240 La. 684, 124 So.2d
908 (1960) (rear end collision; plaintiff's failure to equip trailer with rear light
was negligence that contributed to accident) ; Thornton v. F. Strauss & Son,
Inc., 240 La. 455, 123 So.2d 885 (1960) (accident while overtaking vehicle);
Dane v. Canal Insurance Co., 240 La. 1038, 126 So.2d 355 (1961) (head on
collision of vehicles on highway: "emergency doctrine" discussed). Quaere: would
it not be preferable to regard the existence of an emergency as merely an im-
portant factor in determining whether there was negligence, rather than to dis-
cuss the situation as though some special "doctrine" was involved? Cf. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1934) : "In determining whether conduct is negligent toward
another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden emergency not caused
by his own tortious conduct which requires rapid decision is a factor in determin-
ing the reasonable character of his choice of action." Conduct even in an emer-
gency may be properly regarded as negligent. Hence some latitude for judgment
should be reserved by the court.
2. 241 La. 288, 128 So.2d 660 (1961).
3. Note, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 849 (1961).
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esting part of the decision relates to the court's disposition of
the plaintiff's contention that the architects had been guilty of
negligence in failing properly to supervise installation of the
system. The Supreme Court held that the obligation to supervise
the execution of the work, based on the contract between the
architects and the owner of the hospital, imposed no duty on
the architects toward the deceased to know that the boiler was
being installed and to inspect the installation while in progress
and before testing.4 The sole purpose of the inspection called
for by the contract was to insure that the owner would receive
a structure conforming to the plans and specifications. An in-
spection that would fully attain this objective would not neces-
sarily be sufficient to safeguard the workers during the process
of construction. It should also be noted that the choice of the
method of carrying out the contract (as opposed to the ultimate
result to be achieved) is a matter that rests entirely with the
contractor or subcontractor.
LANDLORD'S LIABILITY - KNOWLEDGE OF DEFECT AS
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The landlord in Louisiana is subject to absolute liability to
guests of the tenant for injuries sustained because of defects
in the premises.5 This is in sharp and gratifying contrast to
the common law which accords virtual immunity to the landlord
under such circumstances. However, despite the fact that the
landlord's liability does not rest upon negligence, the contribu-
tory negligence of the tenant or his guest is available as a
defense. In Gilliam v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company7
the petition alleged that due to sweating of the floors of premises
leased by defendant to plaintiff's employer the plaintiff, a maid,
slipped and fell, sustaining injuries. The court, passing on an
exception of no cause of action, announced that the mere fact
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the condition of the floors
did not indicate without more that she was chargeable with
contributory negligence. This indicates to the writer that the
4. This does not suggest that failure to perform a contract duty owed by an
agent to his principal cannot serve as a basis for a tort cause of action in favor
of a third party so long as the protection of the third party was one of the
purposes of the contractual undertaking. Cf. Adams v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
107 So.2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). Seavey, Liability of an Agent in Tort,
1 SOUTHERN LAW QUARTERLY 16 (1916) ; SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 1 (1949).
5. Comment, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 76 (1959).
6. PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (1955).
7. 240 La. 697, 124 So.2d 913 (1960).
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Louisiana courts are not likely to allow themselves to be en-
snared by the assumption of risk dogma that has pestered the
common law whenever faced with a situation where a person
knowingly encounters a peril created by the negligence of the
defendant." By maintaining the problem as one of contributory
negligence, the Louisiana courts are in a position to require a
showing that the self-exposure was unreasonable.
TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION
It is well known that although Louisiana has refused to ac-
cept the family purpose doctrine it has nevertheless consistently
allowed recovery against the husband for the negligence of the
wife while operating the family automobile with his consent and
when she is engaged "on a mission for the community."9 It is
also well established in later cases that even where the wife is
engaged in an errand for her own pleasure with her husband's
permission, the trip is regarded as one for the benefit of the
community. 10 Recently the Supreme Court has announced that
it is essential that the petition in a suit against the husband
allege that the car was being used with the husband's consent,
but that once the permissive user is established it is encumbent
upon the husband to show affirmatively that the mission was
not for the benefit of the community" (a formidable task, in-
deed, for the husband under the Louisiana decisions).
The duty of the motorist who is favored by a stop sign at
a highway intersection came up again for consideration in
Randall v. Baton Rouge Bus Company. 2 However the extent
of this duty may be expressed in the opinions, it is clear that
the appellate courts are determined to maintain a free hand in
dealing with each case as it arises, and the blunt statements
sometimes found in the opinions to the effect that the favored
motorist can assume safely that the other will obey the stop
sign or the red light is a rule that is certain to be avoided on
occasions. The modifying phrases available are numerous and
they allow for considerable leeway. It has been said that the
8. Confusion surrounding the doctrine of assumption of risk is discussed in
an interesting series of articles constituting a symposium on the subject, 22 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REVIEW '1, 5, 17, 77, 90, 108, 122 (1961).
9. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
10. Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So.2d 614 (1950).
11. Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 124 So.2d 904 (1960).




motorist favored by the sign or light must at least use "slight"
care, or that his negligent acts must have been "most substan-
tial.' 13 The Randall case even intimates that the duty is not
simply to do whatever the favored motorist can to adjust to
the situation once he consciously realizes the danger that the
other will not likely obey the duty to stop, but that he is under a
duty to keep some sort of an affirmative watchout.
"We think the duty of a motorist on a favored street to
exercise ordinary care requires that he maintain at all times
a proper lookout. A proper lookout means he should see the
obvious. '14
This, of course, could mean no more than that where the danger
is obvious the court will not accept the favored motorist's version
that he did not see it. It is significant that the intersection
where the accident in question occurred was a peculiarly danger-
ous one, involving a convergence of three streets, and also that
the favored motorist was exceeding the speed limit substantially.
Such value as the case may have lies, not in the rules that were
announced (which were not too clear), but rather in its service
as an example of the latitude of judgment that the court prop-
erly reserves for itself in intersection collisions.
The holding of the trial judge and of the court of appeal
that culminated in the recent Supreme Court decision, DeRouen
v. American Employers Liability Insurance Company, 5 affords
an illustration of the confusion relating to the burden of per-
suasion and the so-called res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Plaintiff
was a guest passenger in a vehicle driven by Mrs. Maturin. The
car collided with the defendant's vehicle at an intersection which
was controlled by a traffic light. Each motorist's view of the
other was at least partially obscured. Both the plaintiff and
her driver-host testified unequivocally that they looked ahead
when they were ten to fourteen feet from the intersection and
that the light before them was green. The defendant testified
with equal certainty that she looked ahead when about ten feet
from the intersection, and that the light was green, favoring
traffic from her direction. All parties appeared to be sincere
in their statements. There was no other testimony except that
13. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-60 Term - Torts,
21 LouISIANA LAW REvIEw 322, 325 (1961).
14. 240 La. 527, 529, 124 So.2d 535, 537 (1960).
15. 240 La. 486, 123 So.2d 896 (1960).
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of a traffic officer who examined the light after the accident
and found that it was operating properly.
Both the trial court and the majority 16 in the court of ap-
peal1 7 apparently assumed that the resolution of the conflict
depended upon the application of res ipsa loquitur, and, con-
cluding that the requirements of that doctrine had not been
met, they disposed of the controversy favorably to the defendant.
The problem faced by the court was indeed difficult from
a practical point of view, but the writer submits that it was
completely foreign to any notion of res ipsa loquitur or any idea
concerning the burden of proof. There was no unexplained ac-
cident involved.'8 If plaintiff was telling the truth, the defend-
ant was clearly negligent. On the other hand, if she was
mistaken, or lying, the defendant was innocent of negligence.
The question, therefore, was entirely one of credibility, with
the burden resting as usual upon the plaintiff. The only function
of the appeal was to determine whether there was manifest
error, and an affirmance would have been justified on this basis.
On the other hand, in view of the fact that two witnesses favored
plaintiff's version, while only one witness contradicted plaintiff,
and all witnesses were conceded by the trial judge to be equally
credible, the court of appeal could have concluded that the trial
judge was in manifest error by assuming that it was as likely
that two witnesses were simultaneously mistaken as that the
one contradictory witness was in error. Again, would it not
be proper to hold on appeal that the trial judge, misled by the
false analogy to res ipsa loquitur, did not even undertake to face
the difficult question of credibility?
On appeal, the Supreme Court managed to avoid the entire
problem by insisting that the controversy was not to be resolved
solely in terms of the contradicted question as to who was
favored by the light. There is a duty upon the favored motorist
to maintain some kind of watchout when she approaches an
16. Tate, J., dissented.
17. DeRouen v. American Employers Insurance Co., 118 So.2d 522 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1960).
18. The only purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to permit an inference of negli-
gence to be drawn from the mere occurrence of an unexplainable accident when
certain conditions have been met. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Infer-
ence, 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 70, 75-79 (1941). The doctrine has been held
inapplicable in cases of unexplained collisions between two private vehicles result-
ing in the injury of a guest passenger. Dunaway v. Maroun, 178 So. 710 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1937). Malone, op. cit. 8upra, at 103, 104. Contra, Weddle v. Phelan,
177 So. 407 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937).
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intersection at a time immediately after the lights have changed.
Having posited the problem on this broader base, the Supreme
Court felt justified in imposing liability on both drivers. It
could be appropriately found that each of them either ran a red
light or, if favored by the light, failed to adjust properly to the
other's misconduct. Under either hypothesis the guest passenger
was entitled to recover.
Collisions resulting from an effort to negotiate a left hand
turn at the moment that a vehicle following attempts to over-
take are frequent. It would appear that ordinarily the responsi-
bility for avoiding a collision with the overtaker should rest
primarily upon the driver who proposes to undertake a left turn,
for the latter knows that he proposes to obstruct the opposite
traffic lane, while ordinarily the overtaker cannot have such
knowledge. On the other hand, the responsibility for a collision
with an oncoming car should rest primarily with the overtaking
vehicle, whose driver is obliged to determine that the opposite
lane is clear of oncoming traffic. In other words, the party who
is in the better position to observe and direct his course of
action accordingly should, in fairness, bear the cost. However,
in Thomas v. Barnett19 the driver of the overtaking vehicle was
characterized as contributorily negligent when his truck collided
with the left-turning car of the defendant. No oncoming vehicle
was involved. The opinion contains observations that are dif-
ficult to appreciate and which are likely to arise and haunt the
court in future controversies of this kind. It is important that
no specific act of negligence was discoverable on the part of
the overtaker. The court stated, "We have likewise found plain-
tiff Thomas negligent in not assuring himself that he could
safely pass Barnett's truck. ' 20 Obviously, the occurrence of the
accident shows that the overtaking plaintiff's judgment proved
on hindsight to be erroneous. But is negligence to be inferred
merely because of mistaken judgment? Is the question not,
rather, whether the judgment was reasonable or unreasonable?
The court suggests nothing that would show that the overtaking
plaintiff's conduct or judgment differed in any way from the
judgment that is exercised in similar situations day after day
by millions of overtaking motorists on American highways. If
the opinion is to be taken as the court's considered judgment,
we are obliged to conclude that those who undertake to pass
19. 240 La. 363, 123 So.2d 87 (1960).
20. Id. at 374, 123 So.2d at 91.
19621
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
other vehicles do so entirely at their own peril. Throughout the
opinion the court emphasized the irresolvable conflict in the
testimony with reference to the conduct of all parties. Perhaps
underlying the final judgment was the thought that whenever
the court cannot make heads or tails out of what happened it
is best to let the cost of the risk lie where it fell (upon the
shoulders of the injured plaintiff). This reaction would have
warranted the court in dismissing plaintiff's claim because he
failed to establish negligence on the part of defendant. But if,
as apparently was the case, the court was fairly convinced that
defendant was guilty of careless conduct in negotiating the left
turn as he did, and if it was in doubt as to the conduct of plain-
tiff, the better course would be to permit recovery for the reason
that defendant had failed to carry the burden of establishing
contributory negligence. The dissenting opinion of McCaleb is
worthy of careful consideration.
Frequently situations that involve relatively simple issues
such as the issue of negligence or the issue of cause-in-fact are
discussed in terms of last chance or discovered peril. This was
true of the opinion in Franicevich v. Lirette.21 Defendant was
driving through the main street of the town of Buras. Although
he was driving at a lawful and reasonable rate of speed, the
facts indicated that he was not keeping a careful watchout ahead.
Plaintiff, a pedestrian, suddenly darted into the street immedi-
ately in front of the car and was struck and killed. The opinion
emphasized that she could not have been seen in time to enable
the driver to avoid striking her. The case, therefore, resolves
itself into a situation where the defendant's negligent failure
to keep a watchout was not a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's death,
since a reasonable watchout would not have prevented the ac-
cident. The court's conclusion that recovery should be denied
was therefore correct. The opinion, however, was devoted almost
entirely to an explanation as to why the doctrine of "discovered
peril" or "apparent peril" had no application. These doctrines
come into application only where the plaintiff's own negligence
has been set up by defendant as an affirmative defense in an
otherwise recoverable situation. The doctrines are not needed
where plaintiff has failed to establish negligence or, as in the
instant case, where she has failed to show that the negligence
was a cause of the accident. In Franicevich v. Lirette, recovery
21. 241 La. 466, 129 So.2d 740 (1961).
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would be denied even if Mrs. Franicevich had exercised all rea-
sonable care for her own safety. Hence contributory negligence
and discovered peril were foreign to the controversy.
DAMAGES
In a recent death action 22 the Supreme Court, disapproving
an earlier dictum of the previous year, held that the remarriage
of the widow claimant should not be considered in mitigation
of damages for the loss of her husband. The conclusion is
eminently sound. If the remarriage could serve to reduce the
damages to which the widow would otherwise be entitled, she
may be impelled to postpone a contemplated marriage until judg-
ment becomes final. Such a result would not comport with sound
policy. Furthermore, the acquisition of a new source of support
by the marriage can appropriately be regarded as a collateral
benefit, which by tradition does not inure to defendant. There
was therefore sufficient reason of policy to support the court's
conclusion without more ado. For this reason the writer takes
the liberty of expressing serious doubt concerning the wisdom
of the following further observation that appears in the opinion:
"The loss suffered by the surviving spouse is determined
by conditions existing as of the date of the wrongful death
such being the time when a right and cause of action for the
damages arises.123
Damages in personal injury and death cases are frequently the
result of the trier's estimate as to what will happen in the
future. Suppose that the widow were to die after institution
of suit, but before the trial court had handed down its final
judgment. Could it be contended that the damages for loss of
support, which would survive in favor of her administrator,
should be measured by her full life expectancy at the time of
her husband's death, and that evidence of her own death should
be excluded on the trial? Resort to statistical data such as mor-
tality tables is justifiable only because this is the best evidence
available. It is respectfully suggested that pertinent evidence
should never be excluded on trial unless, as in the principal
case, there is some strong policy reason for doing so. Amend-
ments to pleadings indicating changed conditions during the
22. McFarland v. Illinois Central R.R., 241 La. 15, 127 So.2d 183 (1961).
28. 127 So.2d 183, 186.
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course of trial exist for the purpose of making the fact picture
as clear and definite as possible.
In Terry v. Butler24 the defendant, acting without honest
belief in his right (moral bad faith) cut down and hauled away
plaintiff's young growing timber, which he sold as pulpwood to
a good faith purchaser who processed it into paper board. The
principal problem related to the damages. It had been previously
established that a bad faith converter who severs timber and
converts it through his own efforts into a product of increased
value is liable in damages for the value of the completed product
without deduction for the cost of processing, while one who con-
verts in good faith is subject to the same damages minus the
cost of processing. In the instant case, where the converted prop-
erty was processed, not by defendant, but by a good faith pur-
chaser, the court refused damages except for the value of the
wood as converted and delivered to the purchaser as pulpwood.
This appears eminently sound. But it is submitted that the
award was inadequate for another reason. Had the young trees
appropriated by the defendant been unmolested they could serve
the owner as a source of revenue in either or two ways: through
immediate severance for pulpwood, or for eventual timber use
if allowed to grow. By restricting damages to the value of the
young trees as pulpwood the court in effect permitted the wrong-
doing defendant to dictate the purpose to which the owner must
place his standing trees. If young seedlings had been snatched
from the owner's soil and sold for Christmas greenery, would
the pittance that they could bring for this purpose mark the full
measure of the owner's damage? This injustice could be avoided
by adopting the position of the dissenting opinion of Justice
Hawthorne, who would apply the rule used with reference to
the destruction of young crops. A similar and fair result could
be reached by regarding the cutting as a damage to the land.
The presence of the unsevered trees on the land would enhance
its value, not only because of their immediate availability for
pulpwood, but likewise because they represented a potential
source of timber for later severance. Surely it could not be con-
tended that such damages are any more speculative than those
that are regularly allowed for pain and suffering, violation of
privacy, or for wounded sensibilities.
24. 240 La. 398, 123 So.2d 865 (1960).
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